Neopatrimonialism and beyond: reassessing the formal and informal in the study of Central Asian politics by Isaacs, Rico
WWW.BROOKES.AC.UK/GO/RADAR
RADAR 
Research Archive and Digital Asset Repository
Rico Isaacs 
Neopatrimonialism and Beyond: reassessing the formal and informal in the study of Central Asian Politics 
Contemporary Politics (2014), vol. 20, no. 2,  pp. 229-245 
DOI: 10.1080/13569775.2014.907989 
This version is available: https://radar.brookes.ac.uk/radar/items/5624135d-5172-40dd-bb23-987a8ed1c943/1/ 
Available on RADAR: 18.10.2016 
Copyright © and Moral Rights are retained by the author(s) and/ or other copyright owners. A copy can be 
downloaded for personal non-commercial research or study, without prior permission or charge. This item cannot 
be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first obtaining permission in writing from the copyright 
holder(s). The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any format or medium without 
the formal permission of the copyright holders.  
This document is the postprint version. Some differences between the published version and this 
version may remain and you are advised to consult the published version if you wish to cite from it. 
1 
Neopatrimonialism and Beyond: reassessing the formal and informal in the study of 
Central Asian Politics 
Rico Isaacs*
Department of Social Sciences, Oxford Brookes University, Oxford, OX3 0BP United 
Kingdom 
Forthcoming in Contemporary Politics June 2014 
Neopatrimonialism has emerged as the central conceptual label applied by scholars to understand the 
politics of the Central Asian republics. Like the use of neopatrimonialism in other regional settings, 
this article argues that the concept has become susceptible to concept misinformation and stretching. 
Adopting a critical perspective this article highlights three significant problems with the application of 
neopatrimonialism in the study of Central Asian politics: its appropriateness and operationalisation; 
the difficulty in ontologically and empirically untangling the formal and informal; and an inherent 
normativty in its application. While not advocating an abandonment of the concept, the article 
considers instead how it can be used better in conjunction with additional analytical approaches and/or 
concepts. The article proffers that a focus on either formal institutional structures; discourses of 
power; and the concept of ‘multiple modernities’ would aid our comprehension of the region and 
resolve the three issues highlighted in this work. 
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Introduction 
Scholars have long been aware of the problem of ‘concept stretching’ or ‘concept 
misinformation’ in the social sciences (Sartori 1970). The failure to adequately address the 
extent to which concepts can travel from one region of empirical investigation to another can 
lead to what Giovanni Sartori called the ‘the line of least resistance’ (Sartori 1970: 57). For 
comparative political scientists this concerns the stretching of the meaning of concepts to 
account for an ever larger world of study. Precisely unpacking the concepts scholars utilise, 
particularly in relation to emerging regions of study, is important because ‘concepts that are 
not well-defined lead to confusion and elusive language’ (Radaelli 2000: 2). Such conceptual 
blurring ultimately establishes misunderstanding in the ‘ladder of abstraction’ obfuscating 
different levels of the analysis (Sartori 1970: 1043).  
 
This article considers such a case of concept misinformation by examining the ever 
increasing use of neopatrimonialism in the scholarship of Central Asian politics. The study of 
post-Soviet Central Asian politics has been underpinned by the social-scientific dichotomy of 
formal and informal politics (Peyrouse 2012; Laurelle 2012; Schiek and Hensell 2012; Isaacs 
2010, 2011; Radnitz 2011; McGlinchey 2011; Fumagalli 2007; Collins 2006; Schatz 2005). 
Specifically this dichotomy has been operationalised mostly through the concept of 
neopatrimonialism (Ishiyama 2002; Ilkhamov 2007; Georg Geiss 2012; Franke, Gawrich and 
Alakbarov 2009). The analytical turn toward the formal-informal binary was as a 
consequence of the perceived lack of utility and normativity of the 
democratisation/transitotology frameworks which dominated 1990s scholarship on the former 
Soviet Union (Carothers 2002; Collins 2006; McGlinchey 2011).1 However, since then 
neopatrimonialism has become ubiquitous in the study of the region and is used as shorthand 
for describing the complex interplay between regimes and elites.  
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This article critiques the application of neopatrimonialism in the study of Central Asian 
politics illustrating how its conceptual misuse has led to gaps in our understanding in relation 
to three specific issues. First, there is a problem with the operationalisation of the concept. 
Often neopatrimonialism is misapplied to discern regime types, when rather it is better suited 
to comprehending the nature of authority and legitimation within regimes. At the same time, 
there has been a tendency to privilege the informal in analytical terms over the formal and 
this has led to a degree of conceptual and analytical disorder. The relationship between the 
formal and informal in Central Asia is far more dynamic than currently suggested. While on 
the surface informal patronage networks, corruption and personal leadership may seem to 
always supersede and pervade formal institutions; in actuality the hierarchy in the 
relationship between the two is context dependent. Second, the dynamism and interactivity 
between the formal and informal complicates the assumed simplified dichotomy. The 
distinction between the two is not always clear and unambiguous and it is often analytically 
challenging to observe where the formal ends and the informal begins. Third, there has been 
an intrinsic normativity in the application of the concept to Central Asia. In particular, 
implicit in its application is an assumed trajectory towards modernity premised on a liberal-
democratic conception of rationality. Consequently, when interpreted in this way the informal 
component of the concept is understood as deviant and anti-democratic. For example, clan 
politics, personalist leadership and informal networks of exchange which form the basis of 
much of the study of Central Asian politics are inferred as barriers to the consolidation of 
transparent, rule-bound formal institutions which could provide the foundation for democracy 
in the region. This is problematic as it treats neopatrimonialism as a simple stepping stone 
towards democracy and thus does not provide an adequate conceptualisation for the varying 
developmental trajectories open to Central Asian states.  
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The article does not advocate a complete abandonment of neopatrimonialism. Rather it seeks 
to suggest how the concept can be better employed. Neopatrimonialism can be used as an 
overarching category to understand regime legitimation and the forms of authority and 
political relations which underpin that legitimation (although not necessarily a category to 
describe regime type), but we should also consider utilising additional analytical pathways to 
overcome the three problems highlighted in this article. Firstly, a greater focus on the formal 
institutional side of neopatrimonial authority would alleviate the fixation on the ‘informal’. 
Formal institutions continue to persist and be used by ruling regimes as part of the structuring 
and legitimation of power in the region. Our fetishisation with the informal in Central Asian 
politics, and the extent to which the informal pervades the formal, has obscured our 
understanding of the important role formal institutions can play in supporting neopatrimonial 
authority. Therefore, there is much to be gained from utilising the insights and scholarly 
approaches rooted in the ‘institutional turn’ in comparative authoritarianism (Pepinsky 2013). 
Secondly, the opacity of the formal-informal dichotomy can be overcome by shifting the 
analytical focus to the discourses of power which underpin neopatrimonial authority. In other 
words, we need to observe and explain the discourses which establish the belief (or perceived 
belief) in the Central Asian leaders and their legitimate right to domination. Rather than 
attempting to locate where the boundaries between the formal and informal lie, we could 
unpack the symbolic and discursive mechanisms which aid legitmation of neopatrimonial 
authority. Moreover, it would allow scholars to introduce the concept of state-society 
relations into the analysis, as any examination of discursive mechanisms of power also needs 
to consider the reception and audiences of such discourses. Thirdly, the normativity 
underpinning the use of neopatrimonialism could be conquered by applying the concept of 
‘multiple modernities’. The current use of neopatrimonialism in the Central Asian context 
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does not explain how the regimes reproduce themselves or take on other developmental 
trajectories whether more democratic or more personalist. Utilising ‘multiple modernities’ 
provides the opportunity to remove the shackles of liberal-democratic normativity and 
recognise the various developmental trajectories open to Central Asian states. However, as 
will be discussed, in each case these three additional analytical pathways do involve some 
trade-offs which need to be recognised if they are to be used in conjunction with 
neopatrimonialism.  
 
This article is in three sections. The first analyses the concept of neopatrimonialism and the 
development of its use in the study of Central Asian politics. The second provides a critique 
of the application of neopatrimonialism in Central Asia detailing the three problems 
highlighted above which have led to concept misinformation in this case. The final section 
then examines the three alternative analytical pathways/concepts which can be used in 
conjunction with neopatrimonialism to address each of three problems identified in this work; 
albeit recognising the limitations of doing so in each instance.    
 
Neopatrimonialism  
Neopatrimonialism evolved from Max Weber’s ideal-type of patrimonialism, a pre-
bureaucratic notion of authority and domination. Within patrimonialism a leader’s power is 
observed as legitimate insofar as it is believed to be founded on tradition (Weber, 1978: 
1020). In Weberian logic, patrimonial rule, based on traditional authority, is clearly 
demarcated from bureaucratic rational legal authority.  Norms underpinning patrimonial 
power ‘are not officially written down, nor are they enforced by legal recognition or the 
power of the modern state’ (Grzymala-Busse, 2010: 312-13). Patrimonialism, therefore, 
became a useful category for analysing traditional societies and power structures (Roth 1968; 
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Theobald 1982). Neopatrimonialism, however, emerged in the late 1960s and 1970s as a 
heuristic concept to aid comprehension of the postcolonial transitions occurring in Africa 
(Lemarchand 1972; Eisenstadt 1973; Bratton and Van de Walle 1994). In neopatrimonialism 
formal rational-legal forms of authority coexist with patrimonial forms of domination, and 
the practices inherent to it, (e.g. clientelism, personalism, loyalty, patronage networks) 
(Bratton and Van de Walle 1994). However, relationships of loyalty and dependence have a 
tendency to pervade the formal rational-legal political and administrative system (Bratton and 
Van de Walle 1994: 458). At the heart of neopatrimonialism exists two distinct logics: the 
private/personal and the public/impersonal (Erdmann and Engel 2007: 105). In this sense the 
concept allows for an exploration of the interwoven relationship between perceived forms of 
formal and informal politics. The idea innate to neopatrimonialism is that political power is 
exercised as a form of private property (Erdmann and Engel 2007: 102), and thus illustrates a 
blurring of the private and public divide.  
 
While neopatrimonialism was used initially to understand the tension between traditional and 
bureaucratic authority in postcolonial Africa it became a concept which travelled beyond the 
boundaries of post-colonial scholarship to Asia, Latin America, the Middle East, and 
Southern Europe (Brynen 1995; Mainwaring 1992; Kitschelt H. and Wilkinson 2007; Bechle 
2010). The seeming ubiquity of the concept has led to concerns regarding concept 
misinformation, concept stretching, and the methodological limitations of its use, especially 
in the case of African politics and development where neopatrimonialism is widely 
subscribed as a conceptual label (deGrassi 2008; Pitcher, Moran and Johnston, 2009; Bach 
2011). This literature provides a survey of the uses and misuses of the concept in different 
settings, and this article contributes to this emerging body of literature by highlighting how in 
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the case of Central Asia neopatrimonialism has often been poorly used and how this has 
important implications for our analysis of the region. 
 
As with other parts of the former Soviet Union, scholars studying the politics of the Central 
Asian region initially and understandably framed much of their analysis within the 
democratisation paradigm. The premise of early post-Soviet scholarship was that even if 
Central Asian states were authoritarian laggards, they were at least on a trajectory towards 
democracy and contested politics and it was on this basis that we can make assessments and 
judgements about their political development (Anderson 1995, 1997, 1999; Huskey 1995; 
Bremmer and Welt 1996; Gleason 1997; Cummings 2003). The concentration of power in the 
region’s presidencies, however, led to a focus on the agency of the Central Asian presidents 
(Taras 1997; Cummings 2002). The lack of democratic progress also meant scholars focused 
on the nation-building efforts of political elites (Bohr 1998; Roy 2000). These particular 
literatures alerted scholars to the questionable utility of the democratisation paradigm given 
the consolidation of authoritarianism in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, stalled transitions in 
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, and collapse into civil war in Tajikistan. Moreover, the 
particular characteristics of the agency of presidentialism in Central Asia highlighted the 
power of informal personalism over formal political institutions, while the process of nation-
building began to draw our attention towards the longevity of traditional tribal, clan and 
religious identities in the region and the extent to which they persisted in spite of Soviet 
transformation of the region (Fierman 1991; Jones Luong 2004). The consequence of this was 
a shift in analytical focus to the role and place of informal forms of politics and practices, and 
how they shaped and undermined formal political institutional development. This was 
encapsulated in the clan politics literature (Schatz 2005; Collins 2006).  It was this tension 
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between formal and informal politics which drew scholars’ attention towards the concept of 
neopatrimonialism.2 
 
In Central Asia, the seeming coexistence of traditional and informal forms of politics (such as 
personalism, patron-client relations and clan and tribal based politics) with rational-legal 
formal institutions and rules made neopatrimonialism a seductive concept with which to 
explore the nature of politics in the region. Initially, the concept was employed as a way to 
define regime type and to demarcate differences between the regimes in the region (Ishiyama, 
2002).3 The idea that neopatrimonialism represents an ideal type of the form of regime which 
can be found in the region was soon adopted by many scholars (Ishiyama 2008; Gawrich, 
Melnkovska and Schweickert 2010; Franke, Gawrich and Alakbarov 2009; McGlinchey 
2011; Georg Geiss 2012; Peyrouse 2012; Schiek and Hensell 2012; Lewis, 2012). Largely, 
the benefit of using the concept was that it overcame the perceived crudeness of a Linzian 
typology and assisted in explaining how personal informal politics constrains formal 
decision-making process (Georg Geiss 2012: 188; Collins 2009: 262). As discussed below, 
employing neopatrimonialism to typologise regimes is a conceptual misuse of the term, as 
has already been made evident in the case of neopatrimonialism in African studies (Pitcher, 
Moran and Johnston 2009: 126).  
 
Neopatrimonialism has also been used to unpack regime dynamics where the informal (e.g. 
patronage networks, corruption, clientelism) is understood to subvert the formal (e.g. 
government agencies, formal rational-legal rules) (Ilkhamov 2007: 76-77). Here the concept 
is understood to be correlated and often used as a synonym for patronage networks and 
politics, and bad governance (Peyrouse 2012; McGlinchey 2011; Gawrich, Melnkovska and 
Schweickert 2010) and other forms of state-regime dynamics such as the development of 
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state and bureaucratic structures (George-geiss 2012); political party consolidation and 
development (Ishiyama 2008); inter-elite consensus (Marat 2012) and the relationship 
between resource incomes and autocracy (Franke, Gawrich and Alakbarov 2009). 
Neopatrimonialism’s rise to analytical ubiquity in reached a pinnacle with the publication in 
2012 of a special issue of Demokratizatsiya dedicated to its use in the Central Asian context 
(Laurelle 2012).  
 
The ways in which neopatrimonialism has been adopted in studies on the region, however, 
has often led to confusion and obfuscation. Below the article provides a critique of three ways 
in which the concept of neopatrimonialism has been misinformed or stretched in Central 
Asian politics. These relate to: the appropriateness and operationalisation of the concept 2) 
the oversimplification of the formal/informal dichotomy and 3) the inherent normativity in 
the application of neopatrimonialism  
 
Appropriateness and operationalisation 
In terms of appropriateness and operationalisation there are two ways in which 
neopatrimonialism has been prone to misinformation and stretching. The first relates to the 
level of analysis at which the concept is applied and the second is the extent to which there is 
an emphasis on the informal opposed to the formal.  
 
Personalism, and informal politics proscribed in a broad sense, ‘manifests itself in different 
forms and therefore requires approach from different levels of analysis (Guliyev 2011: 575; 
Helmke and Levitsky 2006: 6-8). In terms of the ‘personal’ logic there are multiple analytical 
levels at which the concept can be deployed. For instance, it can be analysed at the level of 
the state, regime, organisations (networks), practices (corruption) and customs. The problem 
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is that this multiplicity is not always fully realised and instead what can occur is a degree of 
conceptual stretching (Guliyev 2011: 576). For instance, using neopatrimonialism to 
typologise regimes in the region stretches the concept beyond its Weberian origins. 
Patrimonialism was devised by Max Weber ‘as a specific form of authority and source of 
legitimacy’ (Pitcher, Moran and Johnston 2009: 126). Therefore, similar to African Studies, 
scholars reading Central Asian politics by using neopatrimonialism as way to describe regime 
type are either conflating the notion of regime with that of authority, or are making an 
assumed correlation between regime type and authority (Pitcher, Moran and Johnston 2009). 
It is problematic as neopatrimonialism should relate to how the dominant construct their 
legitimacy vis-a-vis the dominated. Thus, it is about how such constructions of authority are 
reciprocated and complied with by society and understood as legitimate (Pitcher, Moran and 
Johnston 2009: 127). This is something which is often missed when neopatrimonialism is 
simply used to define the type of regimes in the region and indicates how a lack of accuracy 
can produce both concept misinformation and conflation within the analysis.   
 
For instance, Alisher Ilkhamov conflates ‘clan networks’ and ‘state corruption’. This 
establishes a form of conceptual disorder as one is an organisation (clan network) and the 
other is an informal practice (corruption) (Ilkhamov 2007: 68). Similar conflation occurs in 
Franke et al (2009:112) where they conflate ‘state’ and ‘regime’ within their definition of 
neopatrimonial. Notwithstanding the inappropriateness of applying neopatrimonialism at the 
level of regime, as discussed above, the conflation of these two concepts is a typical symptom 
of the stretching of neopatrimonialism within Central Asian studies. In post-Soviet politics it 
is difficult to distinguish between the ‘state’ and ‘regime’, as the personal authority of a 
regime can often be contrived as state power, however, it remains important not to treat them 
as the same within the analysis (Robinson 2008: 3). The problem with conflating the two in 
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relation to neopatrimonialism is that not distinguishing between a neutral state bureaucracy 
on the one hand, and the personalised nature of authority and legitimacy on the other, 
undermines the purpose of the concept. The interaction between the impersonal state and 
patrimonial authority weakens the operational logic of the concept given it is a heuristic 
device to analyse the interaction between both the personal and impersonal logics of authority 
and legitimation.  
 
The second problem related to the appropriateness and operationalisation of 
neopatrimonialism is the extent to which often the informal is privileged while limited 
attention is placed on the formal (Ishiyama 2002; Gawrich, Melnkovska and Schweickert 
2010; Georg Geiss 2012; Collins 2006; Schatz 2005). In other words it is always important to 
ask what is the neo in neopatrimonialism? In Franke et al the ‘neo’ is defined only by the fact 
that informal networks may not always be formed on family, kinship or a traditional basis 
(Franke, Gawrich, and Alakbarov 2009: 113). The onus here is on the personal, and in this 
case the informal networks tied to the renterism of the state and not in any analytical category 
which concerns impersonal, rational-legal, codified rules. This weighting on the informal is 
peculiar because it would imply we should just adopt patrimonialism as a concept to study 
the case of Central Asia (Collins 2009).  
 
However, simply applying patrimonialism is also unsatisfying. There is a reason scholars 
have been reaching for neopatrimonialism as a conceptual tool and that is because the formal 
still matters in Central Asia, but the problem is we are not sure how, why or in what way it 
matters. We know the informal matters (Morris and Polese 2013), yet the formal still remains 
important in respect to authority and legitimation and scholars acknowledge this explicitly 
(Ilkhamov 2007: 66). What requires greater attention when using neopatrimonialism in 
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Central Asia is the dynamic, interchangeable and flexible nature of neopatrimonial authority. 
It is not simply the case that the informal always prevails (Collins 2006: 11). The formal can 
take precedence depending on the contingent context. For example, Erica Marat has 
illustrated how Kurmanbek Bakiyev used his position as Acting President in the aftermath of 
the 2005 Tulip revolution in Kyrgyzstan to centralise authority in his person (Marat 2012: 
332). Neither the personal or impersonal logic is fixed and the conflicting modes of 
organisation and their legitimation, and the particular constellation they make up at any given 
point is dependent upon material conditions and instances of agential political choice 
(Robinson 2012: 3). In other words the situation between the two logics is dynamic and 
neopatrimonialism is a far broader system than just narrow regime type or the simplistic 
reading of the informal personal supplanting the formal impersonal. The relationship between 
the formal and informal is mutually accommodative and ‘can thus be conceptualized as a 
mutually reinforcing one, as a mutually constitutive cycle of reproduction’ (Erdmann and 
Engel 2007:105). Sequencing, therefore, between the two is dependent on the given context 
and it is this which needs to be given consideration when employing neopatrimonialism and 
the particular level of analysis it is aimed at. 
 
Formal-informal dichotomy 
Any simple dichotomy between the informal and formal, particularly as conceptualized 
within neopatrimonialism, is problematic not least because in its operationalisation as a 
concept it is often difficult to observe where the formal ends and informal begins. Edward 
Schatz highlights this problem when discussing the relationship between clans and the state. 
As Schatz argues: 
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“such strong adherence to Weberian thinking does not equip us to consider syncretic 
outcomes and the ways in which clans and the state adapt to new environments. If 
clans and the state begin in fundamental opposition (a hypothetical empirical starting 
point, not a necessary one), this opposition is not fate. Forms of mutual 
accommodation can soften the antagonism” (Schatz 2005:233). 
 
To what extent is either political logic (the formal and informal) empirically tangible and 
differentiated given their constitutive mutualism? An empirical example of accommodation 
between the formal and informal in Central Asia, and thus a muddying of the conceptual 
waters, is the role of Nur Otan (Light of Fatherland) in Kazakhstan. Nur Otan is President 
Nazarbayev’s political party and it has dominated the party system since its conception 
originally in 1999 as Otan (Isaacs 2011:80-82). The usual barometer of defining formal 
institutions is their embodiment of impersonalised rationalism, but in the case of Kazakhstan 
it is clear that while on the surface the party is a formal institution, underneath its operation 
and political success is defined by the personalised power of the president. Nur Otan has no 
ideology or policy agenda separate from that set out by the president in his annual address 
and the party is effectively a personalist dominant party (Isaacs and Whitmore 2013). The 
party is privy to extensive state and administrative resources, including but not limited to, 
vast human resources and patronage networks available to local Akims (governors). 
 
The underlying personalism of the party, and the patronage network’s which sustain its 
dominance illustrate what we might typically understand as the informal pervading the formal 
sphere. Yet, it is not as straightforward as that. For instance, in 2007, the constitution was 
altered lifting the bar on senior state employers becoming members of political parties. Local 
Akims joined Nur Otan en masse and consequently combined their position as regional 
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governors with that of the head of the regional branch of the party. Here it is ontologically 
difficult to see a distinction between the formal and informal. Their state-led position as 
governor is fused with their position as head of the party branch, and the state post provides 
them with an opportunity to benefit the party in terms of membership mobilisation and the 
ability to distribute rents, jobs and other resources to their clientelist networks. It is genuinely 
challenging to observe empirically where the formal ends and the informal begins. Does their 
ability to distribute resources depend on their occupation of rationally-legally defined offices 
of state? Or does it depend on their personal position with Nur Otan?  Or is their power based 
not on either form of office, but instead simply on their personal position within the political 
elite which has been developed over years of networking and clientelism? However, how can 
they cultivate such networks which underpin their power without access to rationally-defined 
offices of state which empowers them with the resources and opportunity to allocate rents to 
loyal clients? The answer to these questions is that probably all of the different formal and 
informal positions and offices play a role. This only highlights, however, the difficulty in 
operationalising the formal/informal dichotomy in the Central Asian context. While this is 
evidence of the blurring of the public and private spheres encapsulated by neopatrimonialism, 
it does not make it easy to empirically observe how the formal and informal operates in this 
context.  
 
Much of the scholarship on Central Asian politics takes the distinction between the formal 
and informal as a given. Yet, given the constitutively accommodative nature of such forms of 
political relations, it is often hard to locate whether domination occurs in a formal legal-
rationally bounded office, or through informal patrimonial means. As discussed below, rather 
than analytically being concerned whether authority lay within boundaries of either the 
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formal or informal logic of neopatrimonial domination, it is perhaps better, given the concept 
is concerned with legitimation, to try and unpack the discourses with underpin that authority.  
 
Normativity 
A further issue related to utilising neopatrimonialism in analysing Central Asian politics is 
the implicit normativity underpinning its application. Despite the recognition from scholars 
that utilising theories of democratisation to understand post-Soviet Central Asia were 
inadequate, how neopatrimonialism has been utilised remains equally problematic (Collins 
2006). Often the assumption in using neopatrimonialism, is that states should be, and are, on 
a trajectory towards a Weberian conception of modernity. In other words, states (and 
regimes) should possess a form of domination which is bounded by the ‘belief in the legality 
of enacted rules and the right of those elevated to authority under such rules to issue 
commands’ (Weber 1978: 212). The use of neopatrimonialism in Central Asia informs us of 
the coexistence of formality and informality in the legitimation of authority, but how it has 
been applied suggests a half-way house in which vestiges of traditional authority, and its 
constituent elements (clientelism, patronage etc), are perceived to possess anti-democratic 
properties and act as a break on democratic governance. Georg Geiss, for instance, argues 
that political liberalisation can only be achieved in Central Asia if bureaucratic-
developmental state structures ‘can be strengthened in order to overcome neopatrimonialism’ 
(Georg Geiss 2012: 197). Therefore, neopatrimonialism is being used to frame analysis of the 
Central Asian states within an idealised democratic paradigm. For instance, John Ishiyama 
evokes neopatrimonialism in relation to the impact of regime type on potential transition 
paths to democracy (Ishiyama 2002). Gawrich et al proffer neopatrimonialism as an 
explanation for bad governance suggesting that strong personal leadership and its associated 
clientelism explains the deviation  from ‘the normal pattern in terms of institutional quality’ 
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(Gawrich, Melnykovska, and Schweickert 2010: 21). While such declarations are not 
controversial, indeed they are undoubtedly correct, it does undermine the rationale of using 
neopatrimonialism as a step away from frameworks which are rooted in understanding 
Central Asia on the premise of a trajectory towards democracy. Additionally, a Weberian 
conceptualisation of the formal and informal in post-Soviet Central Asian politics lends itself 
to inherently depicting the informal as ‘anti-democratic’ and pre-modern. This is perhaps 
mostly observed in the clan politics literature where informal clan networks display a 
tendency to undermine democracy (Starr 2006: 6-7; Collins 2006). The perceived dominance 
of clans and their pervasiveness over formal institutions inhibits pluralism and participatory 
politics (Collins 2006: 53). Informal politics, from this perspective, through the agency of 
actual and fictive kinship based networks are imbued with antidemocratic properties.4 
 
These normative assumptions are problematic as they implicitly suggest Central Asia as an 
‘other’ which needs to conform to the norms of established liberal democracies. Using a 
patrimonial/neopatrimonial paradigm continues to implicitly judge these countries against 
some preconceived ideal (rational-legal authority), and deviations from this ideal, usually 
driven by some form of informal patrimonial politics, undermines these states’ trajectory 
towards a democratic impersonalised ideal. Subsequently, we do not analyse the Central 
Asian polities on their own terms. The use of neopatrimonialism in this context does not 
adequately conceptualise developmental possibilities for the Central Asian states. If we want 
to understand the broader developmental trajectories in political systems which are 
underpinned by legitimation rooted in both traditional and legal-rational authority then the 
concept of neopatrimonialism requires co-joining with an additional concept which 
recognises the multiplicities of potential trajectories. As argued below, the concept of 
‘multiple modernities’ might well be enlightening in this instance. 
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Alternative Analytical Pathways 
The three issues highlighted above demonstrate the way in which neopatrimonialism has been 
susceptible to concept misinformation and/or concept stretching in its application to the 
Central Asian region. The point to emphasise here is not that neopatrimonialism should be 
abandoned in the study of Central Asian politics, rather that we should use it appropriately. If 
we return to Weber’s original intentions with the concept of patrimonialism, which was an 
ideal-type which pertained to a form of domination legitimated by virtue of traditional 
political relations, behaviour and beliefs, then at the general level neopatrimonialism 
concerns a form of legitimation where there is both a belief in the right to dominate through 
enacted legal rules and through belief in the age-old sanctions of tradition.  The problem with 
its application in Central Asia (as has been the case in other regional settings) is that the 
principle purpose of the concept is lost. The remainder of this article provides a discussion on 
potential additional approaches to be co-joined with the concept of neopatrimonialism for the 
purpose of studying Central Asian politics. Each alternative conceptual approach is targeted 
at overcoming each one of the problems with the employment of neopatrimonialism 
highlighted earlier, although in each instance the trade-offs with adopting each approach is 
equally recognised. 
 
Formal Institutional 
As mentioned above, the application of neopatrimonialism in Central Asian studies has led to 
an overemphasis on the informal logic of the concept. Nonetheless, its continued use, and that 
Central Asian leaderships persist in using formal institutions, whether political parties, 
legislatures, or the routinization of their informal personal power through frequent 
constitutional changes, suggests that the formal is important, even if we are not sure why or 
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how. Therefore, given the attention on the informal logic of neopatrimonialism, scholars 
could instead provide greater equity within the analysis and ‘bring the formal back in’. 
Neopatrimonialism should be deployed as a concept which explores the dynamic relationship 
between both formal and informal elements of political systems underpinned by a 
neopatrimonial logic of legitimation. What is the role and place of formal institutions vis-a-
vis the informal, patronage-driven personalistic aspects of political relations and behaviour? 
How are formal institutions used to structure patrimonial relations? And how might they act 
to legitimate such traditional informal relations and behaviour? Naturally it would be 
problematic to take a conventional approach to the study of formal institutions in Central 
Asia. Taking Central Asian parliaments, judiciaries, political parties, elections and 
constitutions at face value, and attempting to unpack their role in structuring political 
behaviour, providing oversight of the executive and in shaping policy outcomes, is unlikely 
to be a fruitful exercise given the extent to which such bodies are believed to be staffed with 
loyal functionaries of the region’s presidents. Nonetheless, there is much to be gained by a 
closer focus on how formal institutions have a role in providing institutional support and 
legitimation to the different authoritarian regimes in the region.  
 
The recent ‘institutional turn’ in comparative authoritarianism could prove instructive in the 
case of Central Asia, exploring as it does how institutions act to contain elite factionalism and 
mobilise popular support for authoritarian rule (Pepinsky 2013; Magaloni and Kricheli 2010; 
Ghandi 2008). For instance, Nur Otan, as a formal institution, provided a mechanism through 
which Nazarbayev was able to contain and formally structure patrimonial elite competition. 
In the five years preceding the creation of Nur Otan in 2006 the Nazarbayev regime had been 
battered by waves of elite fragmentation, with senior officials leaving the confines of the 
leader’s inner and outer circles and publically challenging his authority (Chebotarev, 2006). 
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At the same time, patrimonial elite groups loyal to Nazarbayev also had their own political 
organisations, such as Asar (Together), Dariga Nazarbyaeva and Rakhat Aliev’s party, and 
the Civic Party of Kazakhstan, the political front for Aleksandr Maskevich’s Eurasian 
National Resources Corporation. The 2004 parliamentary election was perhaps the most 
competitively fought in Kazakhstan’s post-Soviet history, and the merger of Asar and the 
Civic Party with Otan to create Nur Otan in 2006 was partially a policy response to solve the 
factional instability of patrimonial politics and consolidate political support behind 
Nazarbayev, while using tough legislation around parties and elections to marginalise 
oppositional forces (Isaacs 2011: 91-103). In analytical terms the purpose is to use 
neopatrimonialism to understand how power is legitimated in a given political system. The 
concept can then by disaggregated by exploring the linkages, interaction and mutually 
constitutive nature between the formal ‘public’ logic (in this case a political party) and the 
informal ‘private’ logic (in this case patrimonial factional elite politics). In this instance, Nur 
Otan acts to structure the informality of patrimonial competition, a form of politics upon 
which Nazarbyaev’s domination is legitimated because of his position as arbiter of such 
competition.  
 
By applying neopatrimonialism is this way it overcomes the inevitable slide towards 
concentrating on the informal (at the expense of the formal), albeit without removing the 
notion of informal forms of political relations and behaviour from the analysis. For example, 
many studies within the ‘institutional turn’, while not explicitly adopting neopatrimonialism 
have analysed how the loyalty of elite factions are brought through the distribution of 
resources and patronage in an effort to sure up the incumbent authoritarian leader’s 
dominance (Gandhi and Przeworski 2007). The advantage of a re-orientation on the formal 
within neopatrimonialism is that it allows scholars to draw attention to questions of political 
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power and elite-led mobilisation and in particular how institutions serve to allow regimes to 
reproduce themselves over time.  
 
Despite the advantages of adopting a formal-institutional approach there are two trade-offs 
which have to be taken into account. Firstly, a formal institutional approach (as found in 
studies of comparative authoritarianism) tends to ignore informal institutions and practices 
and the interaction between formal and informal politics. Therefore, concentrating on the 
formal should not come at the expense of the informal. Secondly, re-focusing on the formal 
does not overcome the issue of trying to ascertain where empirically the formal-informal lay 
in Central Asian politics. That the two logics are mutually constituted can make empirically 
identifying their role and place within this interaction challenging, and a stress within the 
application of neopatrimonialism on one of the particular logics does not resolve this issue. 
 
 
Discourse of Power 
One way in which it would be possible overcome the opacity of the formal/informal 
dichotomy would be to focus less on where power lies (whether formal or informal); and 
instead return to the issue of legitimation. Therefore we can accept that domination in Central 
Asia is legitimated through both informal and forms, without being concerned with a rigid 
dichotomy between the formal and informal where often it is not clear how to both 
ontologically or empirically untangle. The point, however, is to instead unpack how the belief 
in neopatrimonial authority is conditioned. What are the mechanisms through which a bond 
between ruler and ruled in Central Asia is established? In Central Asia this could be most 
observable through an examination of the rhetorical, symbolic and ideological methods and 
mechanisms through which domination is constructed, interpreted and understood 
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(Cummings, 2009). How have the leaders in Central Asia constructed the discourse of their 
domination, and how is it interpreted and given meaning by elites and the wider population? 
Scholars have already begun to examine how leaderships in the region sought to create 
internal ideological signification in order to establish certainty and stability in the aftermath 
of Soviet collapse (Cummings 2009: 1083-84). The use of symbolism and discourse is in 
ample evidence whether it is the attempts to establish charismatic authority through the 
ubiquitous presidential portraits hanging in every public building,  mass spectacles or broad 
discourses and narratives regarding presidential leadership all play some role in the 
configuration of power and domination (Adams and Rustemova 2009). 
 
Many of the discourses perpetuated by ruling elites in Central Asia have played out as an 
ideological shift from communism to nationalism – much of which draws on a 
reinterpretation of historical memory and tradition. For example, in Kazakhstan this can be 
viewed in the attempts of the government to pitch Nazarbayev and the modern Kazakh 
nation-state as being a direct descendent of the Kazakh Khanate of the 17th Century and 
drawing on a reinterpretation of Kazakh history in order to offer a foundation myth for the 
Nation. Often, however, the discourse of legitimation is rooted in the personalistic nature of 
the leadership. The special and unique qualities of the leader are emphasised along with their 
proclivity to deliver state security and prosperity. This is especially the case with Islam 
Karimov and Nursultan Nazarbayev in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan respectively (Matveeva, 
2009: 1109; Rubezhom, 2009). What this draws our attention to are the different discourses 
which maintain the domination of incumbent regimes, the narratives, symbols and meanings 
which are driving post-Soviet state development and the extent to which they could be 
contested at the local level (Polese 2011). 
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A shift towards discursive analysis would have two principle benefits. It would return our 
understanding of the notion of neopatrimonialism (or places where we believe 
neopatrimonialism to exist) back towards a traditional Weberian interpretation of the concept 
which is concerned with the ways in which authority is legitimated. In other words, it enables 
a focus on the relations between the ruler and the ruled. Secondly, as a consequence of the 
first, it would allow scholars to bring state/regime-society relations to the fore of the analysis 
of Central Asian politics. If we are able to observe or explain the extent to which such 
discursive practices resonate or shape belief in the legitimacy of the region’s leaders, and 
their domination underpinned by both formal and informal logics, then we have the 
opportunity to address issues of social change, and eventual processes of political 
development. This is not necessarily about making predictions regarding the extent to which 
society may mobilise either against or on behalf of the regime; rather it concerns bringing 
Central Asian society back into our analysis of the political. It is so we can understand 
aspects of social change vis-à-vis the dominance of the personal power of the presidents in 
the region.  
 
The trade off of such an approach is that there is no specific mechanism through which to 
operationalise neopatrimonialism as a concept. A neopatrimonial state of relations between 
the ruler and the ruled is taken as a given and there would be no attempt to explore the 
mutually constitute dynamic between formal and informal politics. Alternatively, the 
emphasis centres on how the belief in neopatrimonial authority is understood to be legitimate 
through various symbolic and discursive mechanisms. Secondly, conducting research in 
Central Asia which focuses on citizens’ beliefs in the legitimacy of the ruler and how they 
understand and interpret the discourses of power is challenging. The authoritarian 
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environment is such that individuals often practice a form of self-censorship when discussing 
such sensitive political issues.   
 
Multiple Modernities 
While neopatrimonialism may have initially possessed conceptual value in shifting emphasis 
from the democratisation paradigm, the application of neopatrimonialism to the case of 
Central Asia has tended to stress how the informal acts as a break on democratic 
development. This underlying normativity continues to create an idealised expectation 
regarding Central Asian political development. It creates a problem whereby there is a failure 
to recognise the various development paths upon which political systems with an inherent 
combination of both the traditional and legal-rational legitimation can tread. Moreover, it 
does not allow us to adequately conceptualise the ways in which Central Asian elites and 
societies construct, interpret and understand their own political, social and economic 
development. The post-Soviet experience of Central Asia suggests it is on a path to some 
other version of modernity not just rooted in the liberal-democratic experience of rational-
legal authority. Therefore, persistently setting Central Asian political development in the 
context of democratisation by underscoring how the informal personalised aspects of 
neopatrimonialism undermines the legal-rational, fails to capture developmental possibilities 
for the five states. One of the earliest applications of the concept in the case of Central Asia 
by John Ishiyama (2002) did attempt to recognise political diversity in the region by 
illustrating how neopatrimonialism could be used to differentiate the different regime types. 
However, as discussed above, neopatrimonialism is not a regime type. Therefore, while we 
can continue to use neopatrimonialism to unpack and analyse the way in which authority in 
the region is legitimated we require an additional concept to comprehend broader 
developmental issues.  
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A useful concept to adopt in this instance is multiple modernities. ‘Multiple modernities’ is 
rooted in the idea that traditional theories of convergence assume a unified, homogenised and 
inevitable process underlying state development and that alternatively what we need to 
appreciate instead is the differing trajectories of political and social development (Eisenstadt 
2003; Wagner 2010; Fourie 2012: 52-54). Such a notion is pertinent to the study of Central 
Asian development as it allows us to recognise the various developmental paths open to states 
where authority is legitimated by both formal and informal forms of political behaviour and 
relations. Neopatrimonialism does not preclude states developing to something other than 
democracy. We clearly know that the Central Asian states are not following a path towards 
the Westernised norm of modernity, and the application of Weberian influenced concepts 
such as neopatrimonialism is still hindered by a normative bias whereby often it is often 
assumed these states should be on a trajectory from traditionalism to legal-rational modernity. 
Adopting a multiple modernities approach could be far more illuminating and afford scholars 
the opportunity to see  Central Asia less as the deviant norm-defying ‘other’, but instead 
accepting the region on its own terms. It is in many ways about observing Central Asian 
states and elites as constructing their own response to overarching social and economic 
forces. In other words, it is about tackling how Central Asian elites and societies possess their 
own agency and rationalism vis-à-vis modernity. 
 
A good example of how ‘multiple modernities’ can be a useful device in this instance is 
through examining how Central Asian elites often depict state development as unique and 
particular to the historical and cultural experience of their countries. There is a concrete effort 
to set Central Asian development apart from trends in the West. For example, ‘Kazakhstan’s 
path to democracy’ or the ‘Uzbek way’ posits a culturally specific form of democracy in 
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which primacy is placed on state security, sovereignty, a belief in economic reform prior to 
any political reform, a stable and gradual path to democracy, and the benefits of personal 
leadership (Prikaspiikaya Kommuna 2013). External efforts of norm diffusion through bodies 
such as the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) are often viewed as 
the attempt to impose Western values on the region which do not necessarily fit the particular 
historical and cultural mentalities of Central Asians (Associated Press 2012). What it 
illustrates is how Central Asian elites construct their own interpretation of their political 
development vis-à-vis broader global efforts of democratic norm conformity. In doing so they 
seek to differentiate and make their political development distinct from such wider structural 
forces.  
 
Such Central Asian interpretations of modernity and state development are typically 
understood in very instrumental terms by scholars. Presenting their failure to conform to 
international normative standards of democratisation and human rights as a specific tailor-
made form of democracy is often understood as façade attempts to justify and legitimise their 
authoritarian rule – and to ward off Western criticism. These types of conclusions are 
understandable, and no doubt valid. One trade-off of adopting a pluralist conception of 
modernity in order to understand varied developmental paths is that it falls into the position 
of justifying these ‘unique’ models of development. This could lead to the researcher 
legitimising the practice of more or less abhorrent governing tactics which exclude and 
marginalise opposition and dissident politics. Thus in attempting to step away from using 
neopatrimonialism to understanding broader political development because of the tendency to 
slide into normativity, adopting ‘multiple modernities’ as a way to conceptualise the potential 
for diverse and multiple transition paths could also fell prey to a lack of normative neutrality. 
Therefore, any application of ‘multiple modernities’ requires as much care and attention as 
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that of neopatrimonialism. Nonetheless, understanding what Central Asian modernity is, how 
it is constructed and interpreted by regimes, elites and peoples is central to furthering our 
grasp of broader political, social and economic development in the region. Overcoming the 
normative challenge is possible if scholars avoid a degree of cultural and historical 
determinism and keep a clear analytical distance from the subject and understand Central 
Asian specific modernity and development as in a constant process of constitution and re-
constitution with the dominant global hegemonic ideologies of liberal democracy and 
capitalism.  
 
Conclusion 
A strict Weberian interpretation of neopatrimonialism is that the concept concerns the mutual 
co-existence of informal and formal rules and behaviour which are perceived to provide 
legitimacy for the dominant to dominate in any given power relationship. In this sense the 
concept is not suited to defining types of regimes, but rather understanding the behaviour and 
relations which underpin and legitimate a regime’s authority. The misuse of 
neopatrimonialism in the case of Central Asia beyond the confines of its Weberian roots has 
led, to; analytical disorder (as the concept is applied at all kinds of analytical levels); an 
emphasis on the informal over the formal (even though it is a concept for analysing the 
interaction between the two); an ontological and empirical opacity between the boundaries of 
the formal and informal; and an inherent normatitivty in the way it is applied which suggests 
Central Asia should conform to an idealised conception of liberal democracy.  
 
These forms of conceptual misinformation impinge on our ability to discuss and better 
understand Central Asian political development. Often we do not know how exactly the 
formal and informal interact and mutually constitute one another because of the tendency to 
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understand neopatrimonialism as principally being concerned with how the informal distorts 
formal political development through patronage, loyalty and the pervasiveness of corrupt 
practices. The expectation that Central Asian states should reach the impersonalised ideal of 
liberal democracy also hinders our ability to understand the multiple forms of development 
available to the former Soviet republics. Therefore, neopatrimonialism requires more careful 
application and should not be continuously adopted as a label which in and of itself explains 
the complex politics of the region. We should use neopatrimonialism as a way to discern how 
regimes derive their authority through both the traditional and legal-rational – and how both 
the formal and informal act to mutually constitute one another. Therefore, if we choose to 
apply neopatrimonialism we need to do so at a particular level of analysis pertinent to regime 
legitimation taking account of both the formal and informal. An example of this is how 
patronage politics (the traditional-informal level of analysis) operates in relation to party 
politics (the formal) and how their mutual dynamism plays a role in legitimating the authority 
of the regime. Additionally, to overcome each of the three problems identified in this article 
we can choose to adopt additional analytical tools and concepts. The three outlined here (a 
greater emphasis on formal institutions to overcome the predisposition to the informal; a turn 
towards discourses of power as way to address the opacity of the formal informal dichotomy; 
and the adoption of the ‘multiple modernities’ concept in order to address issues of 
normativity) do not come without problems as highlighted in the above analysis. Nonetheless, 
they do offer us a varied set of lenses to re-focus and re-tune our analysis of Central Asian 
political development. They do offer a solution to some of the problems caused by the 
stretching and misuse of neopatrimonialism. Moreover, if used alongside neopatrimonialism 
we can continue to get the best out this Weberian concept while also expanding our 
conceptual toolkit for studies on the region’s politics.    
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There is precariousness to any critical investigation into conceptual misinformation. This 
article is no different. In examining the misuse of neopatrimonialism in Central Asia the 
author is opening up themselves to challenge and scrutiny and there are no doubt pitfalls in 
some of the proposed analytical pathways proposed in this paper (which the author hopes at 
least some have been tentatively addressed). Nonetheless, the purpose of this discussion is 
above all to open up the debate and to challenge our assumptions about how we study, 
analyse and think about Central Asia and beyond. In doing so the hope is that other scholars 
will take up the baton and either find their own response to the criticisms herein or run with 
some of the potential analytical pathways set out here in this contribution.  
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